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The Macrodynamics of Sorting between Workers  
and Firms†
By Jeremy Lise and Jean-Marc Robin*
We develop an equilibrium model of on-the-job search with ex 
ante heterogeneous workers and firms, aggregate uncertainty, and 
vacancy creation. The model produces rich dynamics in which the 
distributions of unemployed workers, vacancies, and worker-firm 
matches evolve stochastically over time. We prove that the surplus 
function, which fully characterizes the match value and the mobility 
decision of workers, does not depend on these distributions. This 
result means the model is tractable and can be estimated. We 
illustrate the quantitative implications of the model by fitting to US 
aggregate labor market data from 1951–2012. The model has rich 
implications for the cyclical dynamics of the distribution of skills of 
the unemployed, the distribution of types of vacancies posted, and 
sorting between heterogeneous workers and firms. (JEL E24, E32, 
J24, J63, J64)
How does the distribution of skills among the unemployed vary with the busi-
ness cycle? How does the quality of matches for workers transiting from unemploy-
ment vary with the aggregate state? Similarly, how is the reallocation of currently 
employed workers to more appropriate matches related to the business cycle? To 
answer these questions and understand the interactions requires a model of the labor 
market which incorporates both worker- and firm-level heterogeneity and aggregate 
uncertainty. Existing equilibrium search models of the labor market with heteroge-
neous workers and firms, such as Burdett and Mortensen (1998) and Postel-Vinay 
and Robin (2002) are steady-state models. They rely heavily on stationarity for 
tractability, which means the equilibrium distributions can effectively be treated as 
parameters rather than state variables.
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In this paper, we develop a stochastic model of random search on the job, with 
ex ante heterogeneous workers and firms and aggregate productivity shocks in which 
firms make state-contingent offers and counteroffers to workers. The model extends the 
work of Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002), incorporating aggregate productivity shocks 
and nonstationary distributions of unemployed workers and worker-firm matches, and 
Robin (2011), introducing firm heterogeneity, vacancy creation, and a meeting func-
tion à la Pissarides (1985). We obtain tractability by working with the function that 
defines the joint surplus of a worker-firm match, rather than the individual value func-
tions of the worker and firm separately. The model delivers rich dynamics in which 
the distributions of unemployed workers, posted vacancies, and worker-firm matches 
evolve stochastically over time. We prove that the surplus function, which defines 
the value of a match and fully characterizes the mobility decision of workers, does 
not depend either on the current wage or on the current distributions of unemployed 
workers, posted vacancies, or worker-firm matches. The implication is that the fixed 
point defining the surplus can be solved for independently from the current distribu-
tions of vacancies, unemployed workers, and worker-firm matches. The evolution of 
these distributions in the stochastic economy can then be solved for exactly, given the 
initial conditions. In addition, decisions about matching and separations are entirely 
independent of the current wage contract (but not of the rules governing rent-sharing).
In the quantitative section of the paper we illustrate the mechanisms of the model 
fitted to the facts about the relative volatility of output, unemployment, vacancies, 
and transitions rates (see Shimer 2005; Hall 2005; and Hagedorn and Manovskii 
2008, among others). We fit the model to moments on the level and volatility of 
output, unemployment, vacancies, transition rates, as well as moments on unem-
ployment duration and the cross-sectional standard deviation of value added per 
job. The ability of the model to reproduce the observed dynamics of unemployment 
at different unemployment durations is very good. We then analyze the interaction 
between two-sided heterogeneity and aggregate shocks with respect to the employ-
ment/unemployment stocks and flows. The estimated matching set is definitely 
cone-shaped and sorting is strongly positive. Therefore, the business-cycle affects 
two margins of the match distribution: low-type worker/high-type firm, and high-
type worker/low-type firms. We find that when the economy recovers from a reces-
sion, employment expands as the result of improving employment opportunities for 
the low-type workers and expanded hiring by low-type firms. Moreover, when the 
economy enters a recession, low-type workers are fired, particularly those matched 
with high-type firms. At the same time, low-type firms hire less and medium/high-
type firms hire relatively more medium/high-type unemployed workers.1
Our work is related to several recent developments in directed search and 
wage-posting models. In the directed-search, wage-posting model of Shi (2009); 
Menzio and Shi (2010a, b, 2011); and Rudanko (2011), the equilibrium is also 
block-recursive: i.e., such that agents’ value and policy functions are independent 
of the endogenous distribution of workers across employment states.2 We have a 
1 See related work by Barlevy (2002) and Sahin et al. (2014) among others. 
2 Kaas and Kircher (2015) extends Menzio and Shi’s model to allow for firm size. Schaal (2012) presents an 
application of Menzio and Shi’s directed search model with firm size, shocks to the first- and second-order moments 
of aggregate productivity, and with idiosyncratic productivity shocks. 
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closely related result. The advantages of our model with respect to the directed 
search model are that two-sided worker-firm heterogeneity is easily introduced; 
search frictions generate imperfect sorting (mismatch) at the equilibrium; workers 
search on the job and employers counter outside offers; and decisions about wages 
and matching are naturally separated. Dynamic versions of Burdett and Mortensen’s 
(1998) wage-posting model have been proposed by Moscarini and Postel-Vinay 
(2010, 2013) and Coles and Mortensen (2016).3 Wage-posting models with large 
firms, with random or directed search, allow one to analyze firm size growth from 
entry to steady-state equilibrium, as well as the response of firm size to aggregate 
shocks. They also link firm size to posted wages. They do not extend well to describ-
ing how different workers match with different firms, and the interaction between 
worker and firm heterogeneity and aggregate shocks.
Unlike wage-posting models, our model does not have a natural definition of firm 
size because we adopt the common approach of one-worker-one-firm matches. Yet, 
it does produce an equilibrium distribution of workers by firm type that moves along 
with the business cycle. Given that all the aforementioned wage-posting models 
assume constant returns to scale with respect to firm size and rule out within-firm 
worker externalities, it is not clear that grouping matches by firm type and calling 
this firm size would produce very different predictions. In addition, because search 
is not directed, our model naturally produces imperfect matching in equilibrium 
(i.e., workers are willing to accept a range of job types and firms are willing to hire a 
range of worker types). For this reason business-cycle fluctuations of mismatch will 
be our main empirical application. As far as we are aware this is the first empirical 
application of a tractable model of equilibrium search with two-sided ex ante het-
erogeneity and aggregate shocks.
Our model adds many important innovations to the prototype model of Robin 
(2011). Both workers and firms are ex ante heterogeneous, which allows us to 
analyze the cyclical patterns of sorting (or mismatch) between workers and firms. 
We also have an explicit vacancy creation decision which means the contact rate 
between workers and firms changes endogenously with the aggregate state, as does 
the distribution of types of vacancies that are posted. Lastly, we allow for production 
technologies in which workers may not agree on the ranking of firms; that the best 
job for worker A may not be the best job for worker B is a natural consequence of 
two-sided heterogeneity. Identification and estimation is also an important source 
of differences. Robin (2011) identified the distribution of worker types from unem-
ployment volatility since in that model identical firms have a threshold worker type 
that varies with the aggregate state; all workers below this threshold are unemploy-
able. We identify worker heterogeneity from unemployment duration dependence 
(some worker types will be in greater demand than others due to firm heterogene-
ity). We identify firm heterogeneity from cross-sectional dispersion of firms’ value 
added. Moreover, we identify the vacancy cost function from time-series variation 
3 Barlevy (2002) presents a model with worker and firm heterogeneity and aggregate shocks. However 
workers (firms) are identical in terms of potential outcomes and the heterogeneity is effectively match-specific. 
Additionally, the full stochastic model is not tractable and is solved by replacing the dynamic bargaining with a 
fixed piece rate wage. 
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in the covariance between vacancies and output, ant the cross-sectional distributions 
of firm productivities.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section I, we present the model 
and our main theoretical result. In Section II, we estimate the model to illustrate 
the quantitative ability to produce reasonable-looking business-cycle dynamics. 
We study the cyclical behavior of mismatch between worker- and firm-types in 
Section III. We conclude in Section IV.
I. The Model
A. Heterogeneous Agents and Aggregate Shocks
The economy is populated by a continuum of infinitely lived workers indexed 
by ability  x , and a continuum of firms indexed by technology  y . The total measures 
of workers and firms are fixed and normalized to 1. The distribution of  x across 
workers is denoted  ℓ(x) and is exogenous. The distribution of  y across firms is uni-
form. So  y is just a way of ranking firms. The distribution of workers per job type is 
endogenous, and determined by firms’ recruiting decisions and workers’ mobility 
decisions. The cost of posting  v job opportunities  c(v) is exogenous. The aggregate 
state of the economy is indexed by  z t . At the beginning of each period the aggregate 
state changes from  z to  z ′ according to the Markov transition probability  π(z, z′ ) .
B. The Meeting Technology
At the beginning of period  t , a measure  u t (x) of unemployed workers of type  x 
and a measure  h t (x, y) of workers of type  x employed at firms of type  y are inherited 
from period  t − 1 , with
  u t (x) +  ∫    h t (x, y) dy = ℓ(x). 
Then, the aggregate state changes from  z t−1 to  z t . For simplicity, we assume that sep-
arations and meetings occur sequentially after the realization of the aggregate pro-
ductivity shock: separations first, then the unemployed and the surviving employees 
get a chance to draw a new offer. Throughout we assume that match formation and 
separation is efficient.
Let  u t+ (x) denote the stock of unemployed workers of type  x immediately after 
the realization of  z t (at time  t+ ) and the ensuing job destructions, and let  h t+ (x, y) be 
the stock of matches of type  (x, y) that survive the destruction shocks. Together they 
produce effective search effort
  L t =  ∫    u t+ (x) dx + s ∬    h t+ (x, y) dx dy, 
where the search effort of unemployed workers has been normalized to 1 and  s 
is thus the relative search effort of employed workers. Let  v t (y) denote the mea-
sure of type  y job opportunities chosen by firm  y (see Section IE for details). 
Let  V t =  ∫     v t (y) dy denote the aggregate number of job opportunities. The total 
measure of meetings at time  t is given by  M t = M( L t ,  V t ). Define  λ t =  M t / L t as the 
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probability an unemployed searcher contacts a vacancy, and  s  λ t is the probability an 
employed searcher contacts a vacancy in period  t . Let  q t =  M t / V t be the probability 
per unit of recruiting effort  v t ( y) that a firm contacts any searching worker.
C. The Value of Unemployment
Let  B t (x) be the value of unemployment to a type  x worker at  t . Consider a worker 
of type  x who is unemployed for the whole period  t . During that period she earns 
b(x,  z t ) , which depends on her own type and the current aggregate productivity of the 
economy. She anticipates that at the beginning of period  t + 1 , after revelation of the 
new aggregate state, she will meet a vacancy of type  y with probability  λ t+1   v t+1 (y) _____ V t+1  . 
Let  W 0, t (x, y) be the value to a type  x worker who is hired from unemployment by 
a firm of type  y . We assume that unemployed workers have zero bargaining power 
and are offered their reservation value,  W 0, t (x, y) =  B t (x) . The value to this unem-
ployed worker is then
(1)  B t (x) = b(x,  z t ) 
 +  1 ____ 
1 + r  E t [ (1 −  λ t+1 )  B t+1 (x) +  λ t+1  ∫    W 0, t+1 (x, y)   v t+1 (y) ______ V t+1  dy] 
 = b(x,  z t ) +  1 ____ 1 + r  E t  B t+1 (x),  
where  r is the discount rate and  E t is the expectation operator with respect to future 
aggregate states given the information set at time  t . The function  B t (x) is indepen-
dent of any worker-specific history as long as home production  b(x, z) is such.
D. The Value and Surplus of a Match
Firms have access to a production technology, defined at the match level, that 
combines the skills of a worker and the technology of a firm with aggregate produc-
tivity to create value added  p(x, y, z) . We will allow for the possibility that positive 
value added may require a threshold level of inputs. For example, a given production 
function may require workers of sufficient skill before value added is positive. We 
allow for complementarities between worker and firm types:  p xy ≠ 0 . However, 
since the production technology is defined at the level of the match, there is no 
complementarity across workers within a firm. Any correlations in output between 
workers at the same firms are attributed to the common firm component.
Let  P t (x, y) denote the present value of a match  (x, y) , including the continuation 
values to the worker and firm upon separation, given the aggregate state of the econ-
omy at time  t . A match  (x, y) produces  p(x, y,  z t ) in period  t , and the continuation 
value depends on whether the match is destroyed at the beginning of period  t + 1 .
Assuming zero fixed investment in job creation, any vacancy generated by job 
destruction is lost and has zero continuation value. There is no severance pay-
ment or experience rating. Hence, after revelation of the new aggregate shock  z t+1 , 
the worker and the firm are better off separated than staying together if and only 
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if  P t+1 (x, y) <  B t+1 (x) . In addition, we allow for a source of idiosyncratic job 
destruction shocks  δ. The match is therefore destroyed with probability
  1 { P t+1 (x, y) <  B t+1 (x)} + δ × 1 { P t+1 (x, y) ≥  B t+1 (x)} , 
and if the job is destroyed the continuation value of the match is the value of unem-
ployment  B t+1 (x) .
The current match continues in period  t + 1 with probability 
(1 − δ)1 { P t+1 (x, y) ≥  B t+1 (x)} . Then the worker draws an alternative offer from 
a firm of type  y′ with probability  s  λ t+1   v t+1 (y′) ____ V t+1  . Let  W 1, t (x, y, y′ ) be the value offered 
at time  t by a firm of type  y to a worker of type  x who has an alternative employ-
ment opportunity of type  y′ . We adopt the sequential auction framework of Postel-
Vinay and Robin (2002). The incumbent employer can make new wage offers to 
their existing workers in an attempt to retain those with outside offers. Incumbent 
and poaching firms engage in Bertrand competition which grants the worker a 
value equal to the second highest bid. Specifically, either  P t+1 (x, y′ ) >  P t+1 (x, y) 
and the worker moves to firm  y′ and receives the incumbent employer’s reser-
vation value  W 1, t+1 (x, y′, y) =  P t+1 (x, y) as continuation value; or  P t+1 (x, y′ ) ≤  P t+1 (x, y) and the worker stays with her current employer with continuation 
value  W 1, t+1 (x, y, y′ ) =  P t+1 (x, y′ ) .4 Hence, Bertrand competition makes the con-
tinuation value of the match independent of whether the employee is poached:
(2)  P t (x, y)  =  p(x, y,  z t )
 +   1 ____ 
1  +  r  E t  [ (1 − (1 − δ )1 { P t+1 (x, y) ≥  B t+1 (x)} )  B t+1 (x)
+  (1  −  δ)1 { P t+1 (x, y)  ≥   B t+1 (x)}  ((1  −  s  λ t+1 )  P t+1 (x, y) 
+  s  λ t+1  ∫    max    { P t+1 (x, y),  W 1, t+1 (x, y′, y)}   v t+1 (y′ ) _____ V t+1  dy′) ] 
 =  p(x, y,  z t ) 
 +  1 ____ 
1 + r  E t  [ (1 − (1 − δ)1 { P t+1 (x, y) ≥  B t+1 (x)} )  B t+1 (x)
 + (1 − δ)1 { P t+1 (x, y) ≥  B t+1 (x)}  P t+1 (x, y)] . 
4 In the latter case, the aggregate shock may still force the employer and employee to renegotiate if  P t+1 ≥  B t+1 
but the existing contract would imply either  W t+1 <  B t+1 or  W t+1 >  P t+1 , as in Hall (2005) and Postel-Vinay and 
Turon (2010). 
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Finally, defining match surplus as  S t (x, y) =  P t (x, y) −  B t (x) , and combining 
equations (1) and (2), we have
  P t (x, y) −  B t (x) = p(x, y,  z t ) − b(x,  z t )
 +  1 ____ 
1 + r  E t  [ (1 − (1 − δ)1 { P t+1 (x, y) ≥  B t+1 (x)} )  B t+1 (x)
 + (1 − δ)1 { P t+1 (x, y) ≥  B t+1 (x)}  P t+1 (x, y) −  B t+1 (x)] 
 = p(x, y,  z t ) − b(x,  z t )
 +   1  −  δ ____
1  +  r  E t  [1 { P t+1 (x, y) ≥  B t+1 (x)}  [ P t+1 (x, y) −  B t+1 (x)] ] . 
In other words,
  S t (x, y) = p(x, y,  z t ) − b(x,  z t ) +  1 − δ ____1 + r  E t max { S t+1 (x, y), 0} . 
We are now in a position to state our main result.
PROPOSITION 1: The surplus from an  (x, y) match at time  t depends on time 
only through the current aggregate productivity shock  z and does not depend on 
the distributions of vacancies, unemployed workers, or worker-firm matches. 
Specifically,  S t (x, y) ≡ S(x, y, z) such that
(3)  S(x, y, z) = s(x, y, z) +  1 − δ ____
1 + r  ∫    S(x, y, z′ ) + π(z, z′ ) dz′,  
where  s(x, y, z) = p(x, y, z) − b(x, z) and we denote  x + = max{x, 0} .
Outside offers do not change the size of the match surplus, only how it is shared 
between the worker and the firm. When a firm counters an outside offer to retain the 
worker this is done by transferring more of the match surplus to the worker, but has 
no impact on the total surplus in the match. Similarly, when a worker is poached by 
another firm, Bertrand competition ensures that the value to the worker of moving to 
the new match is exactly the total surplus at the previous match. The previous firm is 
then left with zero since vacancies do not have a continuation value.
We can now explicitly express the stocks  u t+ (x) and  h t+ (x, y) as
(4)  u t+ (x) =  u t (x) +  ∫    [1 { S t (x, y) < 0} + δ1 { S t (x, y) ≥ 0}]  h t (x, y) dy 
and
(5)  h t+ (x, y) = (1 − δ) 1{ S t (x, y) ≥ 0}  h t (x, y). 
E. Vacancy Creation
Each period firms can buy the advertising of  v job opportunities from job place-
ment agencies at a price  c(v) ≥ 0 that is assumed independent of the firm’s type, 
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increasing, and convex. In equilibrium, the number of advertised job opportunities 
is determined by equating the marginal cost to the expected value of a job opening,
(6)  c′ [ v t (y)] =  q t  J t (y),  
where  J t (y) denotes the expected value of a contact by a vacancy of type  y , and  q t is 
the probability, per unit of recruiting effort, that a firm contacts a searching worker. 
The assumption that  c( · ) is increasing and convex guarantees a nondegenerate dis-
tribution of vacancies  v t (y) .
Any job opportunity that does not deliver a contact with a worker in the period 
is lost and generates no continuation value. Any contact that does not end up in an 
employment contract is lost and has zero value.5
The expected value of a contact is calculated as
(7)     J t (y) =  ∫      u t+ (x) _____ L t  S  (x, y, z) +  dx
 + ∬     s h t+ (x, y′ )_______  L t   [S(x, y, z) − S(x, y′, z )] +  dx dy′. 
The contact is with an unemployed worker of type  x with probability  
 u t+ (x) ____ L t  and a 
match is formed if the match surplus is positive, in which case it is entirely appro-
priated by the employer. The contact is with a worker of type  x that is currently 
employed at a firm of type  y′ with complementary probability  s h t+ (x, y′) ______ L t  . Poaching 
is successful if  S(x, y, z) > S(x, y′, z) and Bertrand competition grants the poacher a 
value  S(x, y, z) − S(x, y′, z) = P(x, y, z) − P(x, y′, z) .
F. Labor Market Flows
The law of motion for unemployment resulting from meetings between unem-
ployed workers and vacant jobs is therefore
(8)  u t+1 (x) =  u t+ (x) [1 −  ∫   
  λ t   v t (y) ____ V t  1 { S t (x, y) ≥ 0} dy] ,  
and for employment
(9)   h t+1 (x, y) =  h t+ (x, y) [1 −  ∫   
 
 s  λ t   v t (y′ ) ____ V t  1 { S t (x, y′ ) >  S t (x, y)} dy′] 
 +  ∫    h t+ (x, y′ ) s λ t   v t (y) ____ V t  1 { S t (x, y) >  S t (x, y′ )} dy′
 +  u t+ (x)  λ t   v t (y) ____ V t  1{ S t (x, y) ≥ 0},  
subtracting those lost to more productive poachers, and adding the  (x, y) -jobs cre-
ated by poaching from less productive firms and hiring from unemployment.
5 A more sophisticated job creation process could be envisioned, in which fixed initial investments would give 
value to job creation above and beyond the service provided by placement agencies. 
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G. Computation of the Stochastic Search Equilibrium
Following directly from the results presented above, we can solve for the stochas-
tic equilibrium in this environment in two stages:
 (i) For given home production and value-added technologies  b(x, z) and 
p(x, y, z) ; discount rate  r ; exogenous job destruction rate  δ ; and stochastic 
process for the aggregate state  π(z, z′ ) the surplus function  S(x, y, z) is suffi-
cient to determine all decisions regarding worker mobility and is defined by 
the unique solution to the functional equation (3).
 (ii) For a given distribution of worker ability  ℓ(x) , vacancy cost function  c(v) , 
and meeting technology  M(L, V ) ; and for any given initial distributions of 
unemployed workers  u 0 (x) and worker-firm matches  h 0 (x, y) , a sequence of 
aggregate productivity shocks  { z t } t=0 T implies a unique sequence of distribu-
tions of vacancies, unemployed workers, and worker-firm matches
  { v t (y),  u t+1 (x),  h t+1 (x, y)} t=0 T . 
  This sequence of distributions can be calculated by using the surplus function 
S(x, y, z) and iterating on equations (4) to (9) starting from
  { z 0 ,  u 0 (x),  h 0 (x, y)}. 
It is quite remarkable that the dynamics of the distributions of unemployed worker 
types and worker-firm type matches can be solved independently of any reference 
to wages. This property simplifies equilibrium computation substantially, but we 
also think that it makes sense in the current context. It results from the agreement 
between the worker and the firm that the match surplus represents the present value 
of output in the current match plus the continuation value upon separation. The fact 
that its size does not depend on the way it is going to be shared is a property of a 
wide class of models. Moreover, the assumption that match formation and match 
destruction are efficient does not seem very strong. It implies that workers and firms 
never walk away from mutually beneficial matches. If it is better for a worker to take 
a wage cut than become unemployed then the worker will agree to this. If it is better 
for the firm to grant a wage increase than terminate the match then this will occur. 
The value of the surplus, not the wage, is at the heart of the decision to continue or 
terminate the match. However, intuition is rarely straightforwardly confirmed by 
formal models. Some strong assumptions are necessary for the surplus not to be 
a function of the wage or the distributions. Specifically, transferability of present 
values requires linear utility, and our specified offer and counteroffer mechanism 
(which relies on observable states and actions) is needed in order to remove the 
current wage and distributions from the state space.
Before turning to the quantitative application, we note that it is straightforward 
to extend our results to accommodate aggregate productivity growth, idiosyncratic 
shocks to worker and firm productivity, shocks to the meeting technology and/or 
the cost of vacancy creation, and a birth-death process in which the distribution 
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of skills for new labor market entrants may differ from previous generations. We 
briefly sketch some of these extensions in Appendix A.
II. Heterogeneity and Unemployment Volatility
To illustrate the mechanics of the model, we fit the model to moments of standard 
US time series data for the period 1951:I to 2012:IV. We first study the implications 
for the business-cycle fluctuations of job creation, job destruction, employment 
transitions, and unemployment. Then, in the following section, we study the impli-
cations for the dynamics of heterogeneous matching between workers and firms.
In estimation we target the means and standard deviations of the unemployment 
rate, the number unemployed more than 5, 15, and 27 weeks, unemployment-to- 
employment transitions, employment-to-unemployment transitions, job-to-job tran-
sitions, the vacancy-to-unemployment ratio, and the cross-sectional standard devia-
tion of value added per match. We also target the standard deviation of vacancies, the 
standard deviation and autocorrelation of value added, the correlation between vacan-
cies and unemployment, the correlation between unemployment-to-employment 
and job-to-job transitions. Lastly, we target the correlations between aggregate value 
added, on one hand, and unemployment, vacancies,  unemployment-to-employment 
transitions, employment-to-unemployment transitions, and the cross-sectional stan-
dard deviation of value added per match, on the other hand.6 The values of the data 
moments we target in estimation, along with their estimated standard errors cal-
culated using Newey and West’s heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent 
estimator, are listed in Table 1.
These moments are all standard moments used in the literature except for moments 
related to unemployment rates by unemployment duration and to cross-sectional 
standard deviations of firm total factor productivity (TFP). Unemployment duration 
dependence aims at identifying the parts of the model that relate to worker hetero-
geneity. The cross-sectional dispersion of firm TFP aims at identifying the parts of 
the model that relate to firm heterogeneity.
We solve and simulate data from the model at a weekly frequency. We then aggre-
gate the weekly simulated series exactly as in the data to obtain simulated series 
at the quarterly or annual frequency. Details pertaining to the construction of data 
moments, the method of simulated moments estimator, construction of standard 
errors, and specific implementation details are provided in Appendix B.
A. Parametrization
We choose the following parametrization of the model. The distribution of workers 
is assumed to be beta with parameters  β 1 and  β 2 to be estimated. We approximate the 
continuous heterogeneity by a grid of linearly spaced points  x 1 ,  x 2 ,  … ,  x  N x  on  [0, 1] . 
We specify the set of potential job types,  y 1 ,  y 2 ,  … ,  y  N y  on  [0, 1] . The distributional 
assumption on  x has no effect on the value of the surplus function  S(x, y, z) . Similarly, 
6 The firm-level statistics on value added per worker data (more exactly total factor productivity) are taken from 
Bloom et al. (2014, Table A1) and from http://www.stanford.edu/~nbloom/RUBC.zip. These statistics are based on 
a subset of large US firms and, as such, should be thought of as a lower bound for productivity dispersion. 
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we specify a grid of linearly spaced points  a 1 ,  a 2 ,  … ,  a  N z  on  [ε, 1 − ε] ⊂ (0, 1) , 
used to define the aggregate productivity shocks  z i . The aggregate productivity 
shock is given by  z i =  F −1 ( a i ) , and the transition probability  π( z i ,  z j ) ∝ C( a i ,  a j ) , 
where  C is a copula density, and we normalize  ∑ j  π( a i ,  a j ) = 1 . Specifically, we 
set  N x = 21,  N y = 21,  N z = 51 ,  F is log-normal with parameters zero and  σ , and 
C is a Gaussian copula density with parameter governing dependence  ρ .7 We set the 
7 This specification is therefore consistent with the AR(1) model:
  log  z t = ρ log  z t−1 + σ  √ ____ 1 −  ρ 2  ε t ,    ε t ∼ (0, 1). 
Using a copula representation allows us to change the specification of the marginal distribution independently of 
that of the copula, which controls the dynamics of ranks. It also straightforwardly delivers a discrete version of the 
stochastic process. 
Table 1—Data Moments and Model Simulated Moments
Fitted moments Data Model Fitted moments Data Model
 E[U] 0.058 0.059  sd[U] 0.191 0.203
(0.003) (0.018)
 E[ U 5p ] 0.035 0.032  sd[ U 5p ] 0.281 0.315
(0.003) (0.027)
 E[ U 15p ] 0.018 0.018  sd[ U 15p ] 0.395 0.413
(0.002) (0.038)
 E[ U 27p ] 0.010 0.011  sd[ U 27p ] 0.478 0.439
(0.002) (0.045)
 E[UE] 0.421 0.468  sd[UE] 0.127 0.127
(0.020) (0.011)
 E[EU] 0.025 0.028  sd[EU] 0.100 0.095
(0.001) (0.011)
 E[EE] 0.025 0.025  sd[EE] 0.095 0.112
(0.002) (0.005)
 E[V/U] 0.634 0.744  sd[V/U] 0.381 0.306
(0.001) (0.029)
 E[sd labor prod] 0.494 0.505  sd[sd labor  prod] 0.039 0.038
(0.009) (0.005)
 sd[V] 0.206 0.105  corr[V, VA] 0.721 0.996
(0.015) (0.149)
 sd[VA] 0.033 0.034  corr[UE, VA] 0.878 0.978
(0.003) (0.122)
 autocorr[VA] 0.932 0.991  corr[EU, VA] −0.716 −0.910
(0.132) (0.133)
 corr[V, U] −0.846 −0.975  corr[UE, EE] 0.695 0.977
(0.119) (0.108)
 corr[U, VA] −0.860 −0.983  corr[sd labor  prod, VA] −0.366 −0.365
(0.124) (0.260)
Model prediction
 corr(x, y) 0.479 mean 0.700
Mean firm share of  b(x)/p(x,  y ∗ , z) min 0.561
 initial match surplus 0.884 max 0.873
Notes: Standard errors for the data moments, corrected for serial correlation, are presented in parentheses (see 
Appendix BB3 for details). The data used to construct the moments is BLS 1951:I–2012:IV, with the exception of 
the moments involving EE transitions which uses CPS 1994:I–2011:III, and the moments involving sd labor prod., 
which use Bloom et al.’s (2014) 1972–2009 annual Compustat data.  y ∗  (x, z) = arg  max y S(x, y, z) is the best match 
for worker  x when the economy is in state  z .
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length of a period in the model to be one week. The discount rate is set to 5 percent 
annually.
We approximate value added at the match level by a second order Taylor series in 
worker and firm type, assuming proportionality to the aggregate shock  z :
 p(x, y, z) = z ( p 1 +  p 2 x +  p 3 y +  p 4  x 2 +  p 5  y 2 +  p 6 xy) . 
We do not place any restrictions on the polynomial coefficients, which are to be 
estimated.8
We set the flow value of home production to be a fixed fraction of market produc-
tion in the absence of mismatch or aggregate shocks:
  b(x) = 0.7 × p(x,  y ∗ (x, 1), 1), 
where  y ∗ (x, 1) = arg  max y  S(x, y, 1) is the firm type that maximizes surplus for a 
worker of type  x when the aggregate shock is equal to 1. The factor 0.7 is based on 
Hall (2005).
For the meeting function we assume a Cobb-Douglas form
  M t = M( L t ,  V t ) = min {α  L t ω  V t 1−ω ,  L t ,  V t } , 
with  α > 0 and  ω ∈ [0, 1] . With this meeting function and a recruiting cost func-
tion of the form
  c(v) =   c 0  v 1+ c 1   ______
1 +  c 1  , 
equilibrium vacancy creation by firm-type is given by the expression
  v t (y) =  ( α ___  θ t ω   J t (y) ____ c 0  ) 
 1 __  c 1  , 
where aggregating over  v t (y) and substituting for  q t gives equilibrium market 
tightness
  θ t =  ( 1 __  L t  ∫     ( α  J t (y) _____ c 0  ) 
 1 __  c 1  dy) 
  c 1  ____  c 1 +ω
 . 
8 Recall that we are modeling value added not total output. We want to allow the possibility that higher- y firms 
may operate with more costly nonlabor inputs. In this case only workers with skill above a particular threshold 
would produce enough to cover the nonlabor costs and hence deliver positive profit to the firm. For example, sup-
pose  p 1 =  p 2 =  p 3 =  p 4 = 0 ,  p 5 = −1 , and  p 6 = 1 , then only matches in which  x > y will produce positive 
value added. Alternatively, suppose  p 1 = 1 ,  p 2 =  p 3 = 0 ,  p 4 =  p 5 = −1 , and  p 6 = 2 , then value added is 
maximized when  x = y and decreases as  x and  y differ ( x is not well matched to  y ). 
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B. Fit
The empirical and simulated moments are presented in Table 1. Overall the model 
fits the moments very well, the exceptions being the volatility of vacancies, which 
is only one-half as volatile in the model as in the data; the autocorrelation of output, 
which is too high; and the correlations between output and unemployment, vacan-
cies, and the job-finding rate, which are somewhat stronger than in the data.
Table 1 shows that if we draw a long series of aggregate shocks from the estimated 
Markov process (700 years at weekly frequency, discarding the first 100 years) and 
simulate labor market outcomes we obtain series that behave like the observed ones 
in level, volatility, and correlations. We then illustrate the ability of the model to 
propagate the single productivity shock to unemployment, vacancies, and transition 
rates in Figure 1. Figure 1 displays the one-period-ahead predictions of the measure-
ment series. We first filter out aggregate productivity shocks by exactly fitting the 
series of aggregate output. Then, we simulate the change in the other variables using 
this series.9 The fit of the unemployment series is simply spectacular. We slightly 
overestimate the employment-state transition rates (UE and EU) but the dynamics 
are very well reproduced. Job to job transitions, on the limited period of observation 
that we have, are predicted very well. The volatility of simulated job opportunities 
is smaller than in the help wanted series, but vacancy data are notoriously difficult to 
gather. One interpretation of the difference is that it reflects the discrepancy between 
the measurement of job openings in the data and the model concept of aggregate 
recruiting intensity.
C. Parameter Estimates
We now briefly discuss the parameter estimates in Table 2 before turning to the 
implications for the mechanics of the model. Overall the parameter estimates are 
quite precise, indicating that they are well identified by the data, at least locally. 
It is only  p 4 , the loading on  x 2 in the production function, that has a large and 
imprecise coefficient. Aggregate matching efficiency is estimated to be 0.497, with 
search on the job 0.027 times as effective as unemployed search.10 The cost of 
creating a vacancy is mildly convex with the power term estimated to be 1.08. Jobs 
exogenously separate with a weekly probability of 0.013, or a quarterly probabil-
ity of 0.17. The unconditional standard deviation of log  z is estimated to be 0.071, 
with Gaussian copula parameter 0.999. Note that the copula parameter governs the 
variance of  z t conditional on  z t−1 at weekly frequency, making the variance of the 
change in  z very small (see footnote 9).
9 The time-series properties of our filtered shock match the model estimates very well. Regressing the filtered 
series for  log  z t on  log  z t−1 we obtain an autocorrelation coefficient equal to 0.9967 and a standard deviation of the 
residual of 0.001698. Our model estimates imply corresponding values equal to 0.9997 and 0.001638 (see the 
expression in footnote 7). 
10 Typical estimates of the relative efficiency of search on versus off the job are in the range of 0.1 to 0.2. 
Our estimate is lower due to treating workers who transit from employment to unemployment and then back to 
 employment within the same period as having made a job-to-job transition. One implication is that a substantial 
fraction of job-to-job moves in the model would result in a wage cut; an implication that is consistent with empirical 
evidence (see Jolivet, Postel-Vinay, and Robin 2006). 
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The estimated distribution of worker types is presented graphically in panel A of 
Figure 2, where we also present the average distribution of worker types in unem-
ployment (averaged over time). As expected, the skill distribution in unemployment 
is skewed toward low-skilled workers relative to the population distribution.
Market production,  p(x, y, z) , is increasing in worker-type conditional on firm-
type  y. We can think of worker type and worker productivity as having a one-to- 
one mapping. At the same time market production is nonmonotonic in firm 
type  y , conditional on worker type. There is positive complementarity between 
worker skills and firm technology which is stronger in booms than in reces-
sions:  ∂ 2 p(x, y, z)/∂x∂ y = 6.6z . In panel B of Figure 2 we plot the contour lines of 
p(x, y) ≡ p(x, y, z)/z . The contour lines represent increasing output moving from 
left to right. The output-maximizing firm-type is (weakly) increasing in worker 
type. The fact that the output maximizing firm-type is estimated to be increasing 
Figure 1. Data and Model Predicted Time Series
Notes: The dashed line is the HP-filtered data while the solid line is the model simulated data. The simulated data 
is produced by choosing the latent shock process  z t and the scale of output  p 0 to match the time-series of output and 
the mean unemployment rate for 1951–2012.
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in worker-type, and that it is interior for all worker types below 0.6 implies that the 
equilibrium will display positive sorting. Heuristically, we learn about sorting as fol-
lows. The pattern of unemployment rates by duration of unemployment tells us that 
workers leave unemployment at different rates (they do not have homogeneous exit 
rates). Within the structure of the model, this means that some workers can match 
with more jobs than others, illustrated by the cone-shaped matching sets in Figure 4 
(discussed below). The cone-shaped matching sets are generated by a production 
function with positive complementarity (positive sorting). Finally, the fact that there 
is substantial variation in value added per match tells us the complementarity must 
Table 2—Parameter Estimates
Matching  α 0.497 Worker heterogeneity  β 1 2.148
  α  √ ___ LV (0.083) Beta( β 1 ,  β 2 ) (0.192)
Search intensity  s 0.027  β 2 12.001(0.007) (1.951)
Vacancy costs  c 0 0.028 Value added  p 1 0.003
  
 c 0  ____ 1 +  c 1 v  (y) 1+ c 1  (0.014)  p(x, y, z) =  z(  p 1 +  p 2 x +  p 3 y   +  p 4  x 2 +  p 5  y 2 
  +  p 6 xy) 
(0.006)
 1 +  c 1 1.084  p 2 2.053(0.040) (0.684)
Exogenous  δ 0.013  p 3 −0.140
 separation (0.001) (0.504)
Productivity shocks  σ 0.071  p 4 8.035
 Gaussian copula (0.009) (5.422)
  (σ, ρ)  ρ 0.999  p 5 −1.907(0.001) (0.355)
 p 6 6.596(0.835)
Notes: Standard errors, corrected for serial correlation in the data, are presented in parenthe-
ses (see Appendix BB3 for details). Home production is set to 70 percent of maximum out-
put when  z = 1 , i.e.,  b(x) = 0.7 p(x,  y ∗ (x, 1), 1), where  y ∗ (x, 1) = arg  max y S(x, y, 1). The 
interest rate r is fixed at 0.05 annually.
Figure 2. Estimated Distribution of Worker Types and the Production Function
Notes: In panel A we also show the estimated distribution of worker types among the unemployed (averaged over 
all aggregate states). In panel B the contour lines are increasing from left to right. Conditional on firm-type  y , 
p(x, y) ≡ p(x, y, z)/z is increasing in worker-type  x . However  p(x, y) is nonmonotonic in firm-type  y for workers 
with  x -type below 0.6.
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be strong enough to produce substantial differences in output between well-matched 
low-type workers and well-matched high-type workers. Identification of sorting 
clearly leans on the structure of the model. The parametric specification is chosen 
to be flexible yet parsimonious. The nonmonotonicity of output with respect to  y is 
required to generate matching sets that are not identical for all worker types, and the 
resulting differential exit rates from unemployment by worker type. We consider 
this further, along with the cyclical patterns of worker-firm matches in Section III.
D. Model Implications for Aggregate Shocks, Job Creation, and Job Separation
What does the model imply for how the types of vacancies posted and the com-
position of unemployment flows change with the aggregate state of the economy? In 
panel A of Figure 3, we plot the model-predicted expected number of posted vacan-
cies by firm type,  v(y) , when the aggregate state is low or high (below the tenth 
percentile or above the ninetieth percentile of the simulation). Moving from a boom 
to a recession, the number of vacancies posted by firms contracts everywhere, with 
posting of low-type vacancies contracting proportionately more than higher-type 
vacancies.
Our assumption on contracts implies that workers are always offered their reser-
vation value. The implication is that when a firm hires a worker out of  unemployment 
it receives the entire match surplus. However, when it hires a worker who is already 
employed by another firm it only receives the share of the surplus in excess of 
what is necessary to poach the worker. Since there are many more employed than 
unemployed workers, firms expect to receive a share below 1 from newly formed 
matches. The estimated model implies that the initial share of surplus going to the 
firm is 0.88 on average (Table 1). Over time, as the match progresses, the worker 
receives outside offers which erodes the firms’ share, eventually leaving the worker 
with the entire share and the firm with zero when competing with a poaching firm 
of the same type.
Figure 3. Equilibrium Vacancy Creation and Home, Relative to Market Productivity
Note: Low (high) refers to periods when the aggregate state is in the bottom (top) decile of the simulation.
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How much value do productive matches create relative to home production? In 
panel B of Figure 3 we plot the density of  b(x)/p(x, y, z) for low and high aggregate 
productivity (below the tenth percentile or above the ninetieth percentile of the sim-
ulation). Recall that we fixed home production for each worker-type to be equal to 
0.7 times their maximum market production in the absence of productivity shocks. 
Fluctuations in aggregate productivity will scale this ratio up and down, and the 
ratio will be higher for those workers who are not currently employed in their best 
match. The mode of the densities shifts down from 0.725 to 0.675 as we move from 
the low to the high aggregate state. In the low (high) aggregate state there is another 
mass at 0.84 (0.77), corresponding to newly hired workers who have not yet been 
poached and tend to still be some ways from their ideal match.
There is always a small mass of workers for whom home production is very close 
to market production in their current match, more so in the low than in the high 
state. These mismatched workers are the ones at risk of endogenous separation due 
to a negative aggregate productivity shock. We discuss further the composition of 
this group in Section III. What is worth noting here is that for the vast majority of 
matches, market production is substantially higher than home production, this is not 
a small surplus economy. This is especially true in the high aggregate state leading 
firms to respond by posting more vacancies. Fluctuations in the expected match 
surplus generates volatility in vacancy posting and hiring while fluctuations in the 
mass of mismatched workers generates volatility in job separations. The combina-
tion generates volatility in unemployment. Finally, worker and firm heterogeneity 
generates heterogeneity in job-finding rates which produces the observed pattern of 
unemployment rates by duration.
III. Model Implications for Aggregate Shocks and Sorting (or Mismatch)
In this section, we study the implications of the model for the interaction of het-
erogeneity and aggregate shocks. In particular we look at which types of  worker-firm 
matches are feasible in different aggregate states; which types of matches are most 
at risk of separating due to negative aggregate shocks; and the extent to which 
the source of new hires (hired from unemployment or poached from other firms) 
changes with the aggregate state.
A. Feasible Matches and Sorting
The mechanism for how the model combines two-sided heterogeneity and aggre-
gate shocks to produce the cyclicality summarized by the moments in Table 1 and 
the time-series in Figure 1 can be readily understood by examining the shape of the 
estimated surplus function. In Figure 4 we plot the set of feasible matches for the 
tenth, fiftieth, and ninetieth percentiles of the distribution of the aggregate shock. 
The shaded area bounded by the solid line represents all matches which are fea-
sible when the aggregate shock is high (at the ninetieth percentile). The two solid 
lines inside the shaded area represent the boundaries of the feasible set of matches 
when the aggregate shock is at the fiftieth and tenth percentiles. If the aggregate 
state moved from the ninetieth to the tenth percentile, all matches outside the new 
bounds would immediately separate. Additionally, the set of jobs that are feasible 
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for unemployed workers shrinks, since any meetings between workers and firms in 
this region no longer result in a match. Contractions are characterized by both fewer 
contacts, since firms post fewer vacancies, and fewer accepted job offers conditional 
on a contact.
The dotted line represents the ideal firm-type for each worker-type and is cal-
culated as  y ∗ (x, 1) = arg  max y  S(x, y, 1) .11 Unemployed workers initially accept 
any job in the feasible set (conditional on the aggregate state), and through the 
process of on-the-job search gradually move toward the dotted line. As employed 
workers receive offers from other firms they will move toward their preferred firm, 
which will be further from the boundary of the feasible matching set than the initial 
job taken out of unemployment, and hence protected from the effect of aggregate 
shocks. Low-type workers have fewer employment opportunities than higher-type 
workers, and workers with short employment tenure are more cyclically sensitive 
than workers with long tenures who have enjoyed a sustained period of continuous 
employment. Note that the model requires both worker and firm heterogeneity to 
produce these implications.
The upper left boundary of the matching set in Figure 4 corresponds to the min-
imum worker type that is acceptable to a particular firm type, conditional on the 
aggregate state. The lower boundary similarly corresponds to the lowest firm type 
that is acceptable to a worker. Looking at the feasible sets by aggregate state, the 
firms’ reservation worker type fluctuates substantially less than the workers’ reser-
vation firm type. The effect of the business cycle is therefore mostly located in the 
lower part of the distribution of firm types. The matches which are most at risk of 
11 It happens that  y ∗ (x, z) = arg  max y  S(x, y, z) varies little with  z and is close to the value of  y that maximizes 
p(x, y, z), which is indeed independent of  z because of the multiplicative specification. 
Figure 4. Cyclicality of Feasible Matches
Notes: The solid lines mark the boundaries for the set of feasible matches when the aggregate shock is at the nine-
tieth, fiftieth, and tenth percentile (moving from outer to inner lines). The dotted line plots the optimal firm type for 
each worker type,  y ∗ (x, 1) =  arg max y S(x, y, 1).
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endogenous separations due to negative aggregate shocks seem to be the matches 
between low-type firms ( y below 0.15) and high-type workers ( x above 0.2). How 
this translates into aggregate volatility, however, depends on how many matches 
happen to be at these two margins of the matching set in equilibrium.
B. Equilibrium Distribution of Worker-Firm Matches
In Figure 5 we plot the joint distribution of worker-firm matches when the 
aggregate shock is at the tenth and ninetieth percentile of the shock distribution. 
Specifically, we plot  E[ h t (x, y)/ ∬     h t (x, y) dx dy |  z t =  z p ] , where  p indicates the 
tenth or ninetieth percentile of the shock distribution.
From this figure it is clear that there is substantial mass along the boundary relat-
ing to the firms’ reservation worker type. In the model, fluctuations in the aggregate 
state translate into fluctuations in the reservation worker type that is acceptable to 
a given firm type. Comparing panel A and B, we see that while there is substantial 
mass along this boundary in both the low and high aggregate states, the share of 
matches near the boundary is substantially lower in the high state. A smaller share 
of matches are susceptible to endogenous separations, leading to a countercyclical 
job loss rate. The reason there are fewer matches at the boundary in the good states 
is that workers move more quickly to their preferred matches through on-the-job 
search. The process of on-the-job search, results in the second ridge in the joint 
distribution, the center of which corresponds to the surplus maximizing job for each 
worker (the dotted line in Figure 4).
Despite the random meeting of workers and firms, the equilibrium joint distribu-
tion of worker-firm matches tends to feature positive sorting. This results both from 
the selection of workers hired out of unemployment (meetings between high-type 
firms and low-type workers or between low-type firms and high-type workers never 
Figure 5. Joint Distribution of Worker-Firm Matches by Aggregate State
Notes: The low and high aggregate shocks are defined as a z-shock at the tenth and the ninetieth percentile of the 
distribution of aggregate shocks. These correspond to the inner and outer bound in Figure 4. Specifically, we plot 
E[ h t (x, y)/ ∬   
 
 h t (x, y) dx dy |  z t =  z p ], where p indicates the tenth or the ninetieth percentile of the shock distribution. 
The range of x and y is restricted to [0, 0.5] as almost all of the mass in this region.
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result in matches) and also from the tendency for workers to reallocate through 
on-the-job search. To quantify how much dispersion around the optimal matching 
line search frictions and idiosyncratic job destruction shocks are responsible for, we 
calculate the correlation between worker and firm type among productive matches 
holding the aggregate shock at the mean value. There is a moderate rank correlation 
of 0.48 (bottom panel of Table 1). Sorting is definitely positive yet far from perfect.
C. The Business-Cycle Dynamics of Heterogeneous Matches
The comparison of equilibrium distributions of matches for two extreme points in 
the cycle does not allow us to precisely quantify the interaction of aggregate shocks 
and heterogeneity in terms of the types of matches that are formed and dissolved 
and the resulting employment shares. We concisely summarize this interaction in 
Figure 6.
Consider the nonstochastic stationary distribution of worker-firm pairs. This is the 
stationary distribution of matches that is implied by  z t = 1 forever. Define  Q 1 (X ) 
and  Q 3 (X ) as the first and third quartile of workers in the marginal stationary distri-
bution, and partition workers into the three groups:  [0,  Q 1 (X )) ,  [ Q 1 (X ),  Q 3 (X )) , and [ Q 3 (X ), 1] , which we refer to as low, medium and high worker types. Similarly parti-
tion firms into low, medium, and high firm types. In Figure 6, each row corresponds 
to a different labor market outcome. The three columns correspond to the low-, 
medium-, and high-type workers. The three lines in each subfigure correspond to the 
low-type firms (solid), medium-type firms (dashed), and high-type firms (dotted).
In the top row of Figure 6, we plot the employment share for all worker and firm 
types as a function of the aggregate state  z ∈ [0.875, 1.125] . These figures reveal 
that the expansion of employment that accompanies a move from lowest to highest 
aggregate productivity state is largely the result of improving employment opportu-
nities for the low-type workers and expanded hiring by low-type firms. The employ-
ment share for low-type workers increases monotonically with  z (the first panel), as 
does the employment share for low-type firms (the solid line), with the largest gain 
coming from the increased share of low/medium-type worker, low-type firm pairs.
In the second row we plot the job separation rate by type of match. As expected, 
separation rates from all types of matches are (weakly) declining with the aggregate 
state  z . It is the low-type workers who are the most susceptible to job destruction 
induced by a contraction in  z . This is particularly true for low-type workers matched 
with high-type firms. The job destruction rate for these mismatched workers rises by 
20 percent when we move from the highest to lowest aggregate state. For low-type 
workers matched to low-type firms, the job destruction rate only increases by 2 per-
cent. Among medium-type workers, only those who are matched with high-type firms 
have an increased separation rate in low- z states, and this is quite mild.  High-type 
workers are completely shielded from separations induced by the aggregate shocks.
Finally, in the last two rows we plot the share of hires into match-types sep-
arately for workers hired from unemployment and for workers who made a job-
to-job transition. The share of all workers hired by low-type firms (the solid lines 
in each panel) is increasing in the aggregate state for all match types, both for 
hires out of unemployment and for hires from other firms. The hiring patterns for 
medium- and high-type firms are more nuanced. If we consider matches of type 
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medium-medium (column 2, dashed line) and high-high (column 3, dotted line), 
we see that the share of hires into medium-medium and high-high matches who 
come from unemployment is decreasing with  z . In contrast, the share of hires into 
these types of matches where the worker was previously employed is increasing 
in  z . This reflects increased sorting from on-the-job reallocation, which speeds up 
when the aggregate state is high.
Summing up, when the economy enters a recession, low-type workers are fired, 
particularly those matched with high-type firms. At the same time, low-type firms 
Figure 6. Employment Shares, Separation Rates, and Hiring Shares by Aggregate Shocks
Notes: The columns refer to  x  ∈  [0,  Q 1 (X)) , x  ∈  [ Q 1 (X),  Q 3 (X)) , and x  ∈  [ Q 3 (X), 1] respectively. The solid, 
dashed, and dotted lines correspond to  y  ∈  [0,  Q 1 (Y)) , y  ∈  [ Q 1 (Y),  Q 3 (Y)), and y ∈ [ Q 3 (Y), 1] respectively. 
For example, the solid line in the top-left panel is equal to E [ ∫ x∈[0, Q 1 (X))    ∫ y∈[0, Q 1 (Y))   h t (x, y, z) dx dy/ ∬   
  h t (x, y, z) 
dx dy | z] .
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hire less and medium-/high-type firms hire relatively more medium-/high-type 
unemployed workers.
D. The Composition of Unemployment by Unobserved Worker Types  
in the Model and by Education in the Data
Our notion of worker-type in the model corresponds to permanent differences 
in productivity across workers. For the purposes of fitting the model in Section II, 
we treated worker-type as unobserved and estimated the distribution  ℓ(x) . A natural 
measure of permanent productivity in the data is education. Indeed we would expect 
the distribution of worker ability to differ by education level, with likely stochas-
tic dominance when moving from lower to higher education levels. In panel A of 
Figure 7, we plot the education-specific unemployment rate from the CPS data as 
a function of the economy-wide unemployment rate. The unemployment rate for 
each education level is increasing with the overall unemployment rate. There is also 
a clear ordering of unemployment rates by education, with high school dropouts 
having the highest rates and steepest slope, high school graduates having lower rates 
and slope, and college graduates the lowest rates and slope.
In order to construct a similar figure from our model economy, we group work-
ers in a way to mimic education groups. Specifically we create three broad groups 
with differing skill distributions. The low group is drawn from workers below the 
 thirty-third percentile of  ℓ(x) ; the medium group is drawn from workers below 
the sixty-sixth percentile; and the high group is drawn from workers above the 
 sixty-sixth percentile. In this way we have created groups of workers in which the 
distributions of skill stochastically dominate as we move from low to high. We plot 
the unemployment rates of our constructed groups against the overall unemploy-
ment rate in our model economy in panel B. Our group-specific unemployment rates 
lines up very closely to the education-specific unemployment rates from the data.
Differences in the level of unemployment across education groups can result from 
differences in either the flows into unemployment, the flows out of unemployment, 
or both. In panels C and E we plot the education-specific flows from unemploy-
ment-to-employment (UE) and employment-to-unemployment (EU) as a function of 
the overall unemployment rate. For all education groups the UE rates fall and EU 
rates rise with the overall unemployment rate. Interestingly, while the UE rates do 
increase with education, the differences are quite small. The differences across educa-
tion groups in the EU rate are large, with the EU rate strongly decreasing in education. 
We plot the corresponding UE and EU rates for our model groups in panels D and F. 
While our artificial grouping provides a good replication of the education differences 
in unemployment rates, it does less well in replicating the transitions. In particular, 
both the UE and the EU rates for the highest model group are too high; the model gen-
erates too much churning for this group relative to the transitions of college graduates 
in the data. Interestingly, we would obtain a very good approximation for all three 
groups if we simply multiplied the transition rates of the high group by 0.5, which 
would leave the unemployment rate unchanged. Of course then this group no longer 
corresponds to a subset of the skill distribution we estimated.
The distribution of worker heterogeneity in our model is identified using data 
on unemployment levels by duration of unemployment spells. We do not use wage 
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data since the model does not make any predictions about wages without addi-
tional assumptions. Bils, Chang, and Kim (2012) calibrate a Mortensen-Pissarides 
model with two levels of market productivity and two levels of home production, 
 producing four worker types with approximately equal size in the population. All 
matches begin at the maximum possible surplus and endogenous match separations 
Figure 7. Cyclicality of Unemployment and Transitions
Notes: The three panels on the left plot the unemployment rate, the UE rate, and EU rate by education against the 
aggregate unemployment rate (source: CPS). The education groups are high school dropouts ( × ), high school grad-
uates (°), and college graduates (+). The three panels on the right plot the same series for model-simulated data 
using constructed skill groups. The three groups are drawn from the following overlapping segments the population 
distribution of  x : workers below the thirty-third percentile (◊ ), workers below the sixty-sixth percentile ( □ ), and 
workers above the thirty-third percentile ( ∇ ).
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result from  idiosyncratic and aggregate productivity shocks. They calibrate worker 
heterogeneity to match average wages above and below the median, and to match 
average market hours above and below the median, and calibrate match-specific 
shocks to match wage variation. They conclude that heterogeneity is not capable 
of producing substantial volatility of unemployment in their model. The issue is 
that high-type workers display employment fluctuation that are too small relative 
to the data. The fact that our model has two-sided heterogeneity allows for the 
possibility that even high-type workers can be initially mismatched and as a result 
subject to endogenous separation in downturns. Additionally, the tractability of 
our model allows us to work with flexible distributions; in practice we simulate 
with 21 types of workers and 21 types of firms (compared to 4 ex ante types of 
workers and 1 type of firm). This flexibility is important as it allows us to model ex 
ante heterogeneity that varies continuously. With only four points of support there 
would be essentially no ex ante worker heterogeneity within quartiles. The extent 
to which our model is able to also match wage data is an open question. That said, 
we do know that the  stationary version matches cross-sectional wage data very well 
(see Postel-Vinay and Robin 2002). We are currently in the process of specifying 
and estimating a richer version of the model that incorporates more direct empiri-
cal measures of worker and firm heterogeneity, such as measures based on educa-
tion, occupation, wages, value added, and other conditional measures available in 
matched  employer-employee data.
IV. Concluding Remarks
In this paper we develop an equilibrium on-the-job search model of the labor 
market featuring aggregate uncertainty and ex ante heterogeneity in worker and firm 
types. We show that the model has a recursive structure that makes it very tractable. 
We fit the model to US time-series from 1951 to 2012 to illustrate the ability of the 
model to generate aggregate business-cycle dynamics. We then explore the inter-
action between heterogeneity and aggregate shocks in the fitted model in terms of 
the cyclical properties of the distributions of vacancies, unemployed workers, and 
worker-firm matches.
In ongoing work we develop the implications of the model for the  business-cycle 
fluctuations in the joint distribution of wages over worker-firm matches. Using the 
wage-distribution implications (which requires more structure on wage setting than 
what is assumed in the current paper) will allow us to incorporate richer micro-
level shocks at the worker and firm level, and permits estimation using linked 
 employer-employee data.
Appendix A
A1. Model Extensions
In the body of the paper we have restricted our attention to a single source of 
aggregate volatility modeled as an aggregate productivity shock  z . The one-shock 
model is sufficient to demonstrate the theoretical result and generates sufficiently 
rich aggregate dynamics to illustrate how the aggregate shock interacts with the 
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heterogeneity. While the one-shock model is useful for the purposes of the current 
paper, further empirical work based on microdata will certainly want to incorporate 
additional stochastic processes and sources of nonstationarity. We briefly discuss 
how the model can accommodate these extensions, while preserving the recursive 
equilibrium that makes the model tractable.
Aggregate Growth.—All allocations and decisions are identical in a model where 
market production, home production, and the cost of posting vacancies all grow at 
the same rate  g .
Idiosyncratic Shocks.—Shocks to worker skill and/or firm TFP are easily incor-
porated by modifying the surplus function
  S(x, y, z) = s(x, y, z) +  1 − δ ____
1 + r  E x′, y′, z′ [S(x′, y′, z′ ) | x, y, z] , 
and augmenting the flow equations (8) and (9) appropriately.
Nonstationarity in the Meeting and Posting Technology.—One implication of 
the recursive structure of the equilibrium is that the future is fully summarized by 
S(x, y,  z t ) , making the vacancy creation problem effectively static (there is no fixed 
point to solve). This implies that the meeting technology and the cost of posting 
vacancies can vary with time. For example, we can allow for time-varying aggregate 
matching efficiency  α t , or time-varying posting costs  c 0t .
Nonstationary Distribution of Worker Skills.—For simplicity in Section I, we 
assumed that the distribution of worker skills in the population was given by the 
time-invariant distribution  ℓ(x) . This is unlikely to be a good approximation due to 
the fact that the workforce has become much more educated over time, as well as the 
fact that the flow of new immigrants into a country is likely to have a very different 
skill composition than the native population: for example, we may expect it to be 
overrepresentative of the very low and very high skilled. Such nonstationarity can 
easily be accommodated by introducing a birth-death process for workers. At the 
beginning of each period, all workers die with probability  μ and are replaced with 
newborn unemployed workers  n t (x) . The flow equations (4) and (5) become
  u t+ (x) = (1 − μ)  u t (x) +  n t (x)
 +  ∫    [1{ S t (x, y) < 0} + δ1 { S t (x, y) ≥ 0}] (1 − μ)  h t (x, y) dy,
  h t+ (x, y) = (1 − δ)(1 − μ)1 { S t (x, y) ≥ 0}  h t (x, y), 
and the effective discount factor in the surplus function is adjusted to incorporate the 
mortality rate. It is possible to accommodate both population growth and an evolv-
ing skill distribution via an evolving flow of newborn workers  n t (x) .
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The model can accommodate both substantial heterogeneity and nonstationary 
while remaining tractable. Of course the data requirements necessary to identify 
such a flexible model will be great and require further investigation.
Appendix B: Data and Estimation Details
B1. Data Moments
Wherever possible we use publicly available aggregate data. The unemployment 
data are from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and cover the period 1951:1 
to 2012:12. We use the BLS series of seasonally adjusted monthly employment and 
unemployment levels for all persons aged 16 and over. In addition to the number of 
unemployed, we also use the number of unemployed with unemployment durations 
of more than 5, 15, and 27 weeks.12 We divide the unemployment levels each month 
by the sum of unemployment and employment to obtain rates. This gives us monthly 
series for  U m ,  U m 5,  U m 15 , and  U m 27 corresponding to the fraction of individuals unem-
ployed and the fraction unemployed more than 5, 15, and 27 weeks, where the  m 
subscript refers to a monthly frequency.
From these series we construct monthly transition rates between unemployment 
and employment and between employment and unemployment as follows:
  U E m = 1 −  U m+1 5 / U m ,   E U m =  ( U m+1 −  U m+1 5 ) / E m . 
The BLS does not provide a series for job-to-job transitions. We construct this series 
using the Current Population Survey (CPS) for the period 1994:1 to 2012:12. This 
series is constructed following Moscarini and Thomsson (2007).
A time series of monthly vacancies can be constructed by combining the BLS 
monthly Help Wanted Index (HWI) 1951:1 to 2006:12 and the Job Openings and 
Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) 2001:1–2012:12.13 To obtain a consistent series 
we project the HWI series onto the JOLTS series for the overlapping months in the 
years. We then obtain a combined series using predicted HWI based on the JOLTS 
to put them into the same scale. We rescale the vacancy series so that the mean 
vacancy to unemployment rate matches Table 1 of Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008). 
This normalization fixes the scale for the vacancy posting costs.
Output data are provided on a quarterly frequency. We use the BLS quarterly 
series 1951:I–2012:IV of seasonally adjusted real value added in the nonfarm 
business sector.14 Since the value-added series are only provided at the quarterly 
frequency, we aggregate all series up to this frequency by taking the quarterly aver-
age for the monthly series. We HP-filter the log-transformed quarterly series using 
smoothing parameter  10 5 (Shimer 2005).
Finally, we add moments for the mean and standard deviation of productivity dis-
persion, as well as the correlation with output growth at an annual frequency from 
Bloom et al. (2014, Table A1 and supplementary data).
12 Series LNS12000000, LNS13000000, LNS13008396, LNS13008756, LNS13008516, and LNS13008636 
13 Series JTS00000000JOL
14 Series PRS85006043 
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B2. Model Simulated Moments
Using the subscript  t to denote weekly time-series simulated from the model, 
we first construct the weekly series of aggregate value added, (un)employment and 
vacancies,
  U t =  ∫    u t (x)  dx,        V t =  ∫    v t (y)  dy,
  E t (y) =  ∫    h t (x, y)  dx,         E t =  ∫    E t (y)  dy,
  p t (y) =  ∫    p(x, y,  z t )  h t (x, y) dx,   p t =  ∫    p t (y)  dy. 
We calculate the weekly series of the number of unemployed workers with dura-
tions of 5, 15, and 27 weeks or more as
  U t s =  ∫    u t−s (x)  ∏ j=0
s−1[1 −  ∫    λ t−s+j   v t−s+j (y) _______ V t−s+j  1 { S(x, y,  z t−s+j ) ≥ 0}] dy dx, 
where  U t s is the number of unemployed workers at period  t who have been unem-
ployed for  s periods (weeks) or more. We then construct monthly transition rates 
exactly as we did from the BLS data,
  U E m = 1 −  U m+1 5 / U m ,
 E U m =  ( U m+1 −  U m+1 5 ) / E m , 
where the subscript month corresponds to the same week which would be sampled 
by the BLS.15 The monthly job-to-job transition rate is constructed to match the 
construction from the CPS and is calculated as the sum of weekly transition rates 
within a month,
  E E m =  ∑ 
t∈m E E t . 
The resulting series are aggregated exactly as the data to obtain the corresponding 
quarterly moments. For example, quarterly output is obtained by summing over out-
put from the 13 weeks in the quarter and quarterly unemployment rates are obtained 
by averaging over the monthly rates in the quarter.
To calculate the standard deviation of productivity dispersion, we define annual 
output-per-worker at jobs of type  y as
  ϖ a (y) = log ( ∑ t∈a  p t (y)/ ∑ t∈a  E t (y)) , 
15 The BLS survey is done each month in the week containing the twelfth day of the month. We sample from 
our simulated data to replicate this strategy. For example, in the first year of the simulation we sample the monthly 
data from simulation weeks {2, 7, 11, 15, 19, 24, 28, 33, 37, 42, 46, 50}. 
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where  a indexes year, and  
_ ϖa =  ∫     ϖ a (y) dy . We calculate our annual series of the 
cross-sectional standard deviation of value added per worker across firms as
  sd labor prod a =  ( ∫    ( ϖ a (y) −  _ ϖa ) 2 dy)  
1 _
2 . 
We fit the model to moments of the US data from 1950:I to 2012:IV.16 Given 
the specification above, we have 17 parameters to determine:  α,  ω ,  s ,  c 0 ,  c 1 ,  δ ,  σ ,  ρ , 
 β 1 ,  β 2 ,  p 1 ,  … ,  p 6 , and  r . We fix the discount rate to 5 percent annually, and fix  ω 
at 0.5.17 This leaves 15 parameters which are estimated to best fit the 28 moments.
To obtain simulated time-series we begin with a distribution of workers across 
employment states and jobs implied by the economy in the absence of any aggregate 
shock. We then simulate the economy for 700 years at a weekly frequency, discard 
the first 100 years to reduce the impact of initial conditions, aggregate to quarterly or 
annual data, and calculate the simulated moments. The GMM objective function is 
nonsmooth and displays many local minima. We use a variant of simulated anneal-
ing and many starting values to address these issues.
While none of the parameters has a one-to-one relationship to a moment, we can 
provide a heuristic description of identification. The main variation can be described 
as follows: the mobility parameters  α ,  s , and  δ are identified by the average rates 
at which workers transit between unemployment and employment, between jobs, 
and from employment to unemployment. The parameters of the latent productivity 
shock,  σ and  ρ , are identified by the standard deviation and autocorrelation of output 
(corrected for selection via the model). The flow cost of creating new vacancies,  c 0 
and  c 1 , governs the response of vacancies to changes in profitability and is identified 
by the standard deviation of vacancies and the correlation of vacancies with output.
The last set of parameters  β i and  p k govern the distribution of worker types in the 
population and value added. The distribution of worker types is identified by the 
pattern in the number of workers unemployed 5, 15, and 27 or more weeks (homo-
geneous workers would imply this distribution is exponential). The contribution of 
firm type to value added can be then identified by the cross-sectional variation in 
value added per job. Correlations over time between the various measurement vari-
ables finally determine the last remaining parameters governing complementarities 
in the production function.
In practice, the standard errors of parameter estimates convey information about 
local identification for our sample data. The standard errors reflect not only the sam-
pling variability of the data moments, but also depend on the partial derivative of 
each simulated moment with respect to each estimated parameter.18
16 The productivity moments are based on data from 1971 to 2011 and the job-to-job transitions moments on 
data from 1994 to 2011. See the Appendix for details on constructing the covariance matrix for the moments in the 
presence of missing data. 
17 Without using direct information on the costs of vacancy creation, there is little hope to separately identify the 
vacancy cost function from the meeting function. 
18 Think of the OLS formula for the variance of the estimator:  σ 2  ( X ⊤ X) −1 . Parameters are imprecisely esti-
mated if the error variance  σ 2 is large or if the model is weakly identified because of near-multicollinearity (i.e.  X ⊤ X 
is near-singular). See Appendix BB3 for the precise expression of the asymptotic variance of the estimates in the 
GMM case of this paper. 
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B3. The GMM Estimator
Let  m ˆ = ( m ˆ 1 ,  … ,  m ˆ N ) denote the  N × 1 vector of data moments that we want 
to fit. Let  m(θ) = ( m 1 (θ),  … ,  m N (θ)) , for  θ a vector of  K parameters, be the cor-
responding theoretical moments. We estimate  θ by
  θ ˆ =  arg min 
θ
    ∑ 
i=1
N
  ω i  (  m ˆ i −  m i (θ) ________ m ˆ i  ) 
2
 , 
where  ω i are fixed weights and we standardize by the moments themselves instead 
of their standard errors, which are less precisely estimated, particularly when the 
variables are autocorrelated. Under standard regularity conditions,
   [ ∑ i=1
N
   ω i  ___  m ˆ i 2  
∂ m i ( θ 0 ) _______∂ θ  
∂ m i ( θ 0 ) _______∂ θ ⊤  ]  ( θ ˆ −  θ 0 ) =  ∑ i=1
N
   ω i  ___  m ˆ i 2  ( m ˆ i −  m i (θ))  
∂ m i ( θ 0 ) _______∂ θ +  o P (1). 
Assuming that, for a large sample size  T ,
  m ˆ ∼   (m( θ 0 ),  Σ ˆ ) , 
with  Σ ˆ =  o P (1/T  ), then
  θ ˆ ∼   ( θ 0 ,  J ˆ−1 I ˆ  J ˆ−1 ) , 
for
  J ˆ =  ∑ 
i=1
N
   ω i  ___  m ˆ i 2  
∂ m i ( θ ˆ ) _____∂ θ  
∂ m i ( θ ˆ ) _____∂ θ ⊤  =  M ˆ 
⊤ Ω ˆ M ˆ ,    M ˆ =  ∂ m( θ ˆ ) _____∂ θ ⊤  
  Ω ˆ = diag (  ω 1  ___ m ˆ 1 2 ,  … ,  
 ω L  ___ m ˆ L 2 ) ,         I ˆ =  M ˆ ⊤ Ω ˆ Σ ˆ Ω ˆ M ˆ . 
B4. The Variance-Covariance Matrix of the Vector of Moments
The vector of moments consists in sample averages, standard deviations, and 
correlations of some vector  y t = (  y 1t ,  … ,  y Lt ) of variables. Let
  f 1i (  y t , m) =  y it −  μ i ,    f 2ij (  y t , m) = (  y it −  μ i )(  y jt −  μ j ) −  ρ ij  σ i  σ j , 
where  m = [μ; σ; ρ] is the vector of parameters,19 for  μ = (  μ 1 ,  … ,  μ L ) the vector 
of means,  σ = ( σ 1 ,  … ,  σ L ) the vector of standard deviations, and  ρ =  ( ρ ij ) i>j the 
vector of (nontrivial) correlations.
The vector of moments  m ˆ is obtained as the solution to
  E ˆ  f 1i (  y t ,  m ˆ ) =  1 __T   ∑ t=1
T
   f 1i ( y t ,  m ˆ ) = 0,   E ˆ  f 2ij ( y t ,  m ˆ ) = 0,  ∀ i, j. 
19  x = [ x 1 ;  x 2 ] denotes the vertical stacking of vectors  x 1 ,  x 2 . 
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Let  f 1 = (  f 11 ,  … ,  f 1L ) and  f 2 =  (  f 2ij ) i≥j . Let also  f = [  f 1 ;  f 2 ] .
First, we calculate the Jacobian of the transformation  m ↦  E ˆf( y t , m) , that is
  D ˆ =  ∂ E ˆ f(  y t , m) ________∂ m ⊤  |  m= m ˆ  . 
We have
  
∂ E ˆ  f 1i ( y t , m)  _________∂ μ k  |  m= m ˆ  = − 1 i=k , 
where  1 i=k = 1 if  i = k and 0 otherwise,
  
∂ E ˆ  f 1i (  y t , m)  _________∂ ρ kℓ  |  m= m ˆ  =  ∂ E 
ˆ  f 2ij (  y t , m)  _________∂ μ k  |  m= m ˆ  = 0, 
and
  
∂ E ˆ  f 2ij ( y t , m)  _________∂ σ k  |  m= m ˆ  = − ρ ij [ 1 i=k  σ j  +  1  j=k  σ i ],   ∂ E 
ˆ  f 2ij (  y t , m)  _________∂ ρ kℓ  |  m= m ˆ   =  −1  ij=kℓ  σ i  σ j . 
Second, we need to estimate the variance of  f( y t , m) . Given the autocorrelated 
nature of  y t , we use the Newey-West estimator
  S ˆ =  ∑ 
p=−q 
q
  q − |p| _____q  ∑ 
t=1+p
 
T−p
 f( y t ,  m ˆ ) f  ( y t−p ,  m ˆ ) ⊤ , 
where  q is of the order of  T −1/3 . Start low and increase progressively until  S ˆ stabilizes.
Finally, we can estimate the asymptotic variance of  m ˆ as
  Σ ˆ =  ( D ˆ ⊤  S ˆ−1 D ˆ ) −1 . 
B5. Implementation Details
In practice, we use a lag order of 8 in the Newey-West covariance estimator. 
The fixed weights used in estimation  ω , are equal to 100 for  E[U] and  sd[VA] ; 10 
for  E[J2J] ,  E[sd labor prod] ,  sd[U] ,  sd[V/U] ,  sd[sd labor prod] ,  sd[V] ,  autocorr[VA] , 
corr[sd labor prod, VA] ; and 1 for all other moments. These weights were selected to 
ensure the model replicated the variability and persistence of output, the level and 
variability of the unemployment rate and variability of vacancy creation: moments 
that have been of primary interest in the related literature. The calculation of stan-
dard errors outlined above fully accounts for the use of these fixed weights.
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The moments are not necessarily smooth functions of the parameters due to 
simulation noise. To estimate the derivative of each moment with respect to each 
parameter  ∂ m( θ ̂)/∂ θ , we simulate the model for 101 equally spaced values for each 
parameter  θ k ∈ [0.5  θ ̂k , 1.5  θ ̂k ] holding all other parameters at their estimated  values, 
and saving the vector of moments for each evaluation. We then fit a  polynomial of 
degree 9 for each moment as a function of each parameter. The derivative of this 
polynomial evaluated at  θ ̂ is our estimate of  ∂ m( θ ̂)/∂ θ .
Finally, missing data for the job-to-job and productivity series means that the 
cells of the covariance matrix of the data are calculated using only the maximal 
available data for each cell. As a result the covariance matrix  S ̂ is not guaranteed to 
be positive semidefinite (although it will be asymptotically). To ensure invertability, 
we multiply the diagonal of  S ̂ by  1 + λ where  λ is chosen as small as possible such 
that all eigenvalues of  S ̂ are positive. In the current case  λ = 0.6003 . As a robust-
ness check, we calculate the standard errors of the moments using only the data 
available for all series and find only minor differences.
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